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ABSTRACT 
 
In the decade before the current economic crisis, the US biotechnology industry was booming. In 
a 2006 book, Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of Biotech, Gary Pisano 
implies that, given the 10-20 year time-frame for developing biotech products and the lack of 
profitability of the industry as a whole, the US biotech boom should not have happened. Yet the 
biotech industry has received substantial funding from venture capital firms as well as from 
established companies through R&D alliances. Why would money from venture capitalists and 
big pharma be flowing into an industry in which profits are so hard to come by?  The purpose of 
this article is to work toward a solution of what might be called the “Pisano puzzle”, and in the 
process to provide a basis for analyzing the industrial and institutional conditions under which 
the growth of the US biopharmaceutical (BP) industry is sustainable. One part of the answer has 
been the willingness of stock-market investors to absorb the initial public offerings (IPOs) of a 
BP venture that has not yet generated a commercial product, and indeed may never do so. The 
other part of the answer is that the knowledge base that BP companies can tap to develop 
products comes much more from government investments and spending than from business 
finance. Indeed, we show that, through stock buybacks and dividends, established corporations in 
the BP industry have been distributing substantial sums of cash to shareholders that may be at the 
expense of R&D. We use the framework that we have developed for analyzing the sustainability 
of the US BP business model to pose a number of key areas for future research, with an emphasis 
on the implications of the financialization of this business model for the generation of safe and 
affordable BP drugs. 
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1. The “Pisano Puzzle” 
 
In the decade before the current economic crisis, the US biotechnology industry was booming. 
According to Ernst & Young’s annual global biotechnology reports,1 measured in 2008 dollars, 
US biotechnology revenues increased from $20 billion in 1996 to $70.1 billion in 2008, while 
R&D spending in the industry increased from $10.8 billion to $30.4 billion. In 1996 the industry 
had 1,308 biotech firms, of which 260 were publicly listed; and in 2008, 1,754 companies, of 
which 371 were publicly listed. Employment in the industry increased from 118,000 in 1996 to a 
peak of 198,300 in 2003, before declining to 187,500 in 2004 and 170,500 in 2005, and then 
rising again to 190,400 in 2008. 
  
In a book, Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of Biotech, published in 
2006, Gary Pisano, a long-time student of the biotech industry, implies that, given the lack of 
profitability of the industry as a whole, the US biotech boom should not have happened. The 
development of biotech drugs requires the organizational integration of diverse capabilities in a 
cumulative learning process that can take 10-20 years to yield a commercial product with highly 
uncertain prospects for success. In a Harvard Business Review
The typical start-up in biotech is simply going to lack the capabilities of a 
Genentech, which has accumulated R&D experience for more than thirty years.  
In addition, because newer ventures have limited financial resources, they simply 
cannot afford to learn from experience….[G]iven that venture capitalists are 
focused on a liquidity event in a three-year time frame, they have little incentive 
to promote learning at the organizational level.  Finally, the market for know-how 
may also impede learning from experience. The average R&D alliance in 
 article, adapted from the book, 
Pisano (2006a, 114-115) observes that after 30 years “biotech still looks like an emerging 
sector”: 
 
Despite the commercial success of companies such as Amgen and Genentech and 
the stunning growth in revenues for the industry as a whole, most biotechnology 
companies earn no profit. Nor are they significantly more productive at drug 
R&D than the much maligned behemoths of the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Pisano (2006b, 205-209) combines data for 293 US biotech companies that were publicly held in 
2004 to generate totals for revenues and operating income for these companies for 1975 through 
2004.  In 2004 combined revenues were $35.8 billion and operating income $2.5 billion. When 
results for Amgen – the largest dedicated biotechnology firm – are dropped from the totals, 
combined revenues fall to $25.2 billion with a combined loss from operations of $2.1 billion 
(Pisano 2006a, 119). Moreover, one can assume that the biotech companies in existence that 
remained privately held in 2004 were in general less profitable than those that were publicly 
held.   
 
Technological innovation in the biotech industry depends on a process of cumulative and 
collective learning. Yet, Pisano (2006b, 155) argues, “[t]he high rate of firm formation means 
that there are many inexperienced firms in the industry.”  
 
                                                 
1 See www.ey.com/beyondborders for the latest report. 
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biotechnology lasts less than four years (about one-third the expected product 
development cycle).  Alliance partners are interested in the firm achieving its next 
milestone, not in building long-term capabilities. If the biotech firm cannot 
achieve its milestones, the partners have an easy option to terminate the 
relationship. 
 
In other words, given its current organization, Pisano sees the US biotech industry as beset by 
“short-termism”, whereas what this industry needs more than any other is “patient capital”.   
 
Given these characteristics of the industry, one would think that biotech would have had 
difficulty securing investment finance from the business sector. Yet as Pisano (2006b, ch. 8) 
himself shows, biotech has received substantial funding from venture capital firms. For the 
period 1978 through 2004, measured in 2004 dollars, venture capital invested $38 billion in US 
biotechnology companies.  About two-thirds of the venture capital investment (measured in 2004 
dollars) occurred after 1998, with 27 percent in 2000 and 2001 alone (Pisano 2006b, 141).   
 
Once these new ventures are formed, moreover, they often receive funding from R&D alliances 
with established pharmaceutical companies. Average annual expenditures (in 2006 dollars) on 
corporate partnering in the biotech industry, of which R&D alliances are an important form, 
increased from $7.9 billion in 1999-2001 to $10.0 billion in 2002-2004 to $17.2 billion in 2005-
2006 (Burrill 2005; Rosen 2006). An R&D alliance typically includes an R&D contract from the 
established company for the startup to engage in drug development in exchange for intellectual 
property rights and, if and when the drug is approved, certain marketing rights. For almost all 
young biopharmaceutical companies, R&D alliances and other forms of corporate partnering 
represent their major, if not only, source of income (as distinct from equity investments) prior to 
an IPO.  An R&D alliance also typically includes a capital injection into the startup that gives the 
established company an equity stake. 
 
Hence what might be dubbed the “Pisano puzzle”: Why would money from venture capitalists 
and big pharma be flowing into an industry in which profits are so hard to come by?  The 
purpose of this article is to work toward a solution of the Pisano puzzle, and in the process to 
provide a basis for analyzing the industrial and institutional conditions under which the growth 
of the US biopharmaceutical (BP) industry is sustainable.  
 
One part of the answer, which we explore in Section 2 of this paper, is the willingness of stock-
market investors to absorb the initial public offerings (IPOs) of a BP venture that has not yet 
generated a commercial product, and indeed may never do so.  According to Pisano (2006b, 
141), for the period 1978 through 2004, measured in 2004 dollars, public equity markets 
absorbed $168 billion of IPOs and secondary stock issues by US biotechnology companies, with 
about two-thirds of these funds raised after 1993 and most of the money flowing into the industry 
in the speculative boom of 1999-2000.  Besides enabling the BP venture to raise funds for further 
drug development, a stock-market listing also creates the opportunity for venture capitalists and 
other parties, such as R&D partners, with equity stakes in the BP venture to exit from their 
investments, often with a substantial return despite the absence of a commercial product.  
 
The other part of the answer, which we explore in Section 3, is that the knowledge base that BP 
companies can tap to develop products comes much more from government investments than 
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from business investments. We outline the modes and extent of government support for the US 
BP industry, emphasizing the roles of government research funding, subsidies, regulation, and 
spending in enabling an industry that depends on investments in a complex knowledge base to 
exist and grow.   
 
Then in Section 4, we combine the analyses in the previous two sections to highlight the limits to 
the sustainability of the growth of the US BP industry based on its current financing model.  In 
particular, we emphasize the financial behavior of US BP firms that, to boost their stock prices, 
allocate resources to stock repurchases at the expense of investments in productive capabilities 
and to the benefit of the corporate executives who make these allocative decisions.  
 
Finally, in Section 5, we use the framework for analyzing the sustainability of the US BP 
business model to pose a number of key areas for future research, with an emphasis on the 
implications of the financialization of this business model for the generation of safe and 
affordable BP drugs. 
 
2. The US Biopharmaceutical Financing Model 
 
The development of BP drugs requires a unique knowledge base that depends on intense 
interactions among scientists in research institutes and business enterprises.  As a result, 
localities in which these knowledge bases have been built have become centers for new firm 
formation and the growth of BP firms.  There are a number of main centers of BP growth in the 
United States, of which the Boston-Cambridge area is the most concentrated and important (see 
Cortright and Mayer 2002; Feldman 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Porter et al. 2006; 
Lazonick et al. 2007).  
 
Venture capital has become integral to the growth of these regional BP industries. Of $27.6 
billion in venture-capital investments in the US BP industry in 2001-2006, 24.8 percent was in 
the San Francisco area, 17.6 percent in the Boston-Cambridge area, 12.8 percent in the San 
Diego area, and 12.4 in the New York City-Northern New Jersey area (Lazonick et al. 2007). For 
the BP industry as a whole, since 2000 venture-capital investment in the BP industry has been at 
extraordinarily high levels. Figure 1 shows the general rise from the late 1970s to the late 1990s 
in the number of venture-backed biotech firms and the value of disbursements in 2008 dollars. 
After accelerations in both firm and disbursement levels in the last half of the 1990s, venture 
creation and venture funding jumped dramatically in 2000s and have remained high throughout 
the decade. The average annual number of venture-backed companies almost doubled from 288 
in 1996-1999 to 545 in 2000-2003, and averaged 644 for 2004-2008; while the average annual 
amount of disbursements in 2008 dollars increased 2.6 times from $1,981 million in 1996-1999 
to $5,066 million in 2000-2003, and averaged $5,431 million in 2004-2008. 
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Figure 1.  Venture-backed companies and venture-capital investments (in 2008 dollars) in 
US biotechnology, 1978-2008 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial, Venture Xpert 
 
The development of BP drugs is a costly process (Grabowski et al. 2002; DiMasi et al. 2003; 
Light and Warburton 2005a and 2005b; DiMasi et al. 2005a and 2005b; Adams and Brantner 
2006). Replicating the calculations of DiMasi et al. (2003), Adams and Brantner (2006) argue 
that the cost of developing a new molecular entity varies between $500 million and $2 billion in 
2000 dollars. A subsequent study by DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) estimates the average cost 
(in 2005 dollars) of developing biologics as $1.24 billion and pharmaceuticals as $1.32 billion. 
The US BP industry has adopted the formula (suggested by Ligand Pharmaceuticals) that during 
the first decade of its existence, 10 percent of  a BP firm’s funding comes from venture capital, 
50 percent from R&D alliances with established pharmaceutical companies, and 40 percent from 
public equity markets (Hess and Evangelista 2003).  
 
A study by Cortright and Mayer (2002) found that, across nine major metropolitan areas in the 
United States, R&D alliances accounted for $769 million in funding prior to 1990, $4,481 
million from 1991 through 1995, and $9,798 from 1996 through 2001. Data already cited 
suggests that for the United States as a whole average annual expenditure on R&D alliances was 
more than two times greater in 2005-2006 than it had been in 1999-2001 (Burrill 2005; Rosen 
2006). In entering into an R&D alliance, the “startup” (which may have been in existence for  
decade or more) gives up certain property rights to its drug, if and when it is ever approved for 
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sale (Wakeman 2004, 2008). Typically the startup is able to use the revenues and capital 
injections from one or more R&D alliances to convince stock market investors that it is worthy 
of an IPO (as we show in the example of Affymax below). Subject to achieving milestones, the 
R&D alliances can continue to provide income after the IPO (see also Nakajima and Loveland 
2007). Alternatively, R&D alliances can provide the funding for a startup to develop its drug to 
the stage at which an established company deems it worthwhile to acquire it, even though a 
commercial drug has yet to be generated.    
 
Virtually all BP companies that do IPOs are product-less. Pisano (2006b, 143) argues that “only 
approximately 20% of all publicly held companies in existence today have any products on the 
market or are earning royalties based on products commercialized by partners.  Thus the vast 
majority of publicly held biotech firms are essentially R&D entities.”  Schiff and Murray (2004) 
underline the importance of Special Purpose Entities (SPE) and the role that they have played in 
developing several blockbuster drugs. Since the early 1980s investments in R&D have been 
made through SPEs in which a technology developer (inventor) and a sponsor (investor) each 
have equity stakes in a new joint venture founded in the form of an R&D limited partnership or 
Special Purpose Corporation (SPC). The purpose of this strategy is to give up certain rights on 
intellectual property by transferring part of the technology to the new SPE and generating the 
finance necessary for further R&D activities. Special Purpose Accelerated Research Corporation 
(SPARC) and Stock and Warrant Off-Balance-Sheet Research and Development (SWORD) are 
two well-known brand names of SPEs. Companies such as Amgen, Genzyme, Genentech, and 
Biogen made use of SWORD to finance the initial phase of the R&D processes that ultimately 
generated blockbusters (Solt 1993; Schiff and Murray 2004).  
 
If, to generate returns on their investments, venture capitalists and established pharmaceutical 
companies had to wait for a BP drug to be approved for sale on the market, they may not have 
made the investments in the first place. Rather than waiting 10 to 20 years to see whether a 
commercial drug will in fact be produced, the existence of a speculative stock market provides 
them with a mode of exit from their investments by means of an IPO. Figure 2 shows the number 
and value (in 2008 dollars) of venture-back BP IPOs in the United States from 1979 through 
2008.  As can be seen, venture-capital investments are highly variable from year to year, with 
sharp peaks in 1983, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004.   
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Figure 2. Venture-backed initial public offerings in biotech, 1979-2008 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial, Venture Xpert 
 
Alternatively, equity holders can exit through the private sale of the startup to an established 
company, receiving payment in cash or in the company’s listed shares. As Figure 3 shows, such 
M&A deals have become particularly important as a mode of exit in the 2000s. Indeed, in 2006-
2008 the average value of an M&A deal far surpassed the average value of an IPO.  Further 
research will be required to determine whether, as one would assume, the startups that do M&A 
deals are further advanced toward the development of a commercial drug, and hence less 
speculative investments. 
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Figure 3.  Number and value of IPOs and M&A deals in biotechnology, 1979-2008  
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial, Venture Xpert 
 
Note in Figures 2 and 3, the extraordinarily high number and average value of IPOs in 2000, at 
the height of the “New Economy” boom. The speculative character of these investments is 
confirmed in Figure 4, which shows the relation between the annual average movements of the 
NASDAQ Composite Index and the value of venture-backed BP IPOs in current dollars.  
Especially over the past decade, it would appear that stock market speculation has been a critical 
inducement to venture financing of the BP industry. By the same token, the current financial 
crisis has lowered expectations of returns from IPOs (Moore 2008). In 2008 there was only one 
venture-backed IPO in the US biotech industry, and in 2009 thus far (as of July 8) there have 
been none. 
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Figure 4. Value of venture-backed IPOs in current dollars and movements in the NASDAQ 
Index, 1979-2008 
 
 
 
Sources: Thomson Financial, Venture Xpert; Yahoo! Finance 
 
As an example of the relation between venture financing, R&D contracts, and IPOs, on 
December 15, 2006, Affymax, a venture-backed BP company based in Palo Alto, California that 
had been created in 2001 as a spinout from GlaxoSmithKline, did an IPO, raising $92 million 
(Lorenzo 2006).2
                                                 
2 Affymax had actually been founded in 1988 in The Netherlands in 1988 with a research lab in Palo Alto, 
California. GlaxoSmithKline acquired Affymax in 1995 (Kornberg 1995, 93-94) 
 From its founding to its IPO, Affymax recorded a total of $11.7 million in 
revenues, virtually all of it from an R&D partnership worth up to $102 million, inked in February 
2006, with Japan-based Takeda Pharmaceutical (Phil-Carey 2006). At that time, Affymax had a 
therapeutic product under development in the late stages of Phase II clinical trials, with the 
expectation of moving into Phase III trials in early 2007 and the possibility of gaining Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) marketing approval for the drug in 2010; that is, three to four years 
after the IPO. At that point, Takeda will have exclusive rights to market the drug outside of the 
United States.  But Takeda, as well as Affymax’s venture capitalists, do not have to wait until a 
product actually goes to market to generate returns from their investments. As part of the R&D 
partnership, Takeda purchased 2.1 million Affymax shares for $10 million in February 2006.  At 
the IPO some ten months later, Takeda’s shares were worth $63 million.   
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Takeda was able to reap this return on its shareholdings because of the existence of public 
investors who were willing to speculate in the shares of a company like Affymax which was still 
years away from a commercial product. Indeed, from an IPO price of $30.00 on December 15, 
2006, Affymax’s stock rose to a peak price of $41.00 on February 12, 2007, and then began a 
general decline to a low (at the time of writing) of $9.03 on December 23, 2008.  As can be seen 
in Figure 5, both the Affymax stock price and the trading volume in its shares have been very 
volatile, with speculators going into and out of the market in the attempts to lock in speculative 
gains.  The existence of stock market investors looking to make speculative gains on a stock such 
as Affymax is what enables the IPO, which in turn attracts venture capital and big pharma money 
into the BP industry. 
 
Figure 5. Stock-price movements and trading volume of Affymax shares, December 2006-
May 2009 
 
 
Note: Excludes trading volume of 1,997,500 shares on the IPO date, December 15, 2006.       
Source: Yahoo! Finance 
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3. US Government Support for Biotech 
 
Pisano (2006b) does not mention the possibility that such speculative investments in IPOs may 
be responsible for a substantial proportion of the venture, R&D, and public equity funds that has 
flowed into the biotech industry. Even then, the fact that the speculative stock market can enable 
financiers to reap returns on young biotech companies long before they have generated a 
commercial product is only one part of the solution to the “Pisano puzzle”. The other part is the 
role of the government in the biotech industry 
 
It is only in the concluding chapter of the book, where he devotes a few pages to a discussion of 
“the institutions of basic science” that Pisano (2006b, 186) recognizes in a general way the 
centrality of government funding to the biotech industry: 
 
The institutions of basic science include academic research laboratories, 
government research institutes, and government funding of science. These 
institutions have played an important role in advancing the underlying sciences of 
biotechnology. It is hard to imagine what the life sciences would look like today 
without the National Institutes of Health, the University of California, Stanford, 
MIT, Columbia, University of Washington, Harvard, the Whitehead Institute, the 
Institute of Genomic Research, the Human Genome Project, the MRC Laboratory 
of Molecular Biology, dozens of academic medical centers, countless other 
governmental and academic laboratories around the world and journals such as 
Science and Nature. 
 
While Pisano calculates the cumulative flows of venture capital and stock market funds into the 
biotech industry for the period 1978-2004, he attempts no such parallel calculation for 
government funding, notwithstanding his “hard to imagine what the life sciences would be like” 
statement in the paragraph just quoted. In fact, from 1978 through 2004, NIH spending on life 
sciences research totaled $365 billion in 2004 dollars (which can be compared with his figures 
for venture capital and public equity funding cited above).3
                                                 
3 NIH, Office of Extramural Research: 
 Moreover, unlike venture capital and 
stock market investments, which have fluctuated widely from year to year, NIH funding has 
increased in nominal terms in every single year from 1970 to 2008, except for a small decline in 
2006. The rate of increase in funding in real terms was particularly large in 1999-2003 when it 
averaged almost 12 percent per annum.  In 2004 NIH funding in real dollars was double its level 
in 1994 (see Figure 6). Since its inception in 1938 through 2008, US taxpayers invested $668 
billion in 2008 dollars in the work of the NIH. For the 33 years since 1976, when Genentech was 
founded as the first biotech company to take advantage of the new techniques of rDNA, NIH 
funding totaled $555 billion in 2008 dollars. Through the NIH, the US government, and by 
extension the US taxpayer, has long been the nation’s (and the world’s) most important investor 
in knowledge creation in the medical fields. Without NIH funding to create the indispensable 
knowledge base, venture capital and public equity funds would not have flowed into biotech. 
 
  
http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/award/HistoricRankInfo.cfm.    
 12 
Figure 6.  National Institutes of Health funding, 1938-2008, in 2008 dollars 
 
 
 
Source: National Institutes of Health 2009 
 
For 2009 the US Congress has provided the NIH with a budget of $30.4 billion. The NIH uses 16 
percent of its budget to directly employ 19,000 people, of whom almost 6,000 are scientists 
based mainly at the NIH’s 27 centers and institutes in Bethesda, Maryland. The other 84 percent 
of the budget “supports over 325,000 extramural scientists and research personnel at more than 
3,000 institutions nationwide.”4
A number of important changes in government regulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s made 
this knowledge base both more valuable and more accessible to high-tech business interests. The 
 
 
As one of the NIH’s 27 centers, the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), 
created in 1989, was allocated $487 million in 2008, and since its inception its funding has 
totaled over $6.6 billion in 2008 dollars. The most recent addition to the growing number of NIH 
centers and institutes is the National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering 
(NIBIB). It began receiving appropriations in 2002, and through 2007 had total funding of $2.0 
billion in 2008 dollars, including $299 million in 2008.  NHGRI and NIBIB are relatively small 
programs within NIH, together absorbing 2.7 percent of total NIH funds in 2008.  The top three 
centers, together accounting for 41.7 percent of the NIH’s total funds in 2008, are the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI) with 16.3 percent of the total; the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) with 15.4 percent; and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood 
Institute (NHLBI) with 9.9 percent. These knowledge-creating programs are all highly relevant 
to the biotech industry. 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.nih.gov/about/index.html 
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powerful high-tech lobby, led by the American Electronics Association and the National Venture 
Capital Association, that had by the late 1970s emerged from the microelectronics industry 
centered in Silicon Valley convinced the US Congress to alter tax laws that provided financial 
incentives for the allocation of capital and labor to high-tech startups (see Lazonick 2009a, ch. 
2).  Then in the early 1980s, a number of regulatory changes, all connected with intellectual 
property rights, specifically encouraged new ventures in biotech. 
 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 enabled biotech startups to tap the federally-funded knowledge base. 
By giving universities and hospitals clear property rights to new knowledge that resulted from 
federally funded research, Bayh-Dole facilitated the transfer of this knowledge to support the 
creation and growth of new technology firms (Mowery et al. 2004). The motivation for Bayh-
Dole was the growing number of biotech inventions that, it was argued, would be left 
unexploited unless the conditions for the transfer of intellectual property were made less 
restrictive.   
 
In 1980 as well, the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that genetically 
engineered life forms are patentable greatly enhanced the opportunity for the types of knowledge 
transfers that Bayh-Dole envisioned. The decision itself was a 5-4 ruling, and has since been the 
subject of debate (Lewin 1982; Eisenberg 2002; Garcia 2002). Nevertheless, it set a precedent 
for the patenting of genes. In the early 1990s, in the context of the Human Genome Project, even 
the NIH began patenting partial complementary DNA sequences on the grounds that patent 
licenses to biotech companies would encourage product development (see Eisenberg 1992).   
 
In 1983 the passage of the Orphan Drug Act provided another important inducement to biotech 
investment. Designed to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of 
drugs for “rare” diseases, the Orphan Drug Act gives companies generous tax credits for research 
and experimentation as well as the possibility of market exclusivity for seven years from the time 
that a drug is approved for commercial sale by the FDA.5
                                                 
5 http://www.fda.gov/orphan/oda.htm 
 It was argued that without these 
financial incentives many potential medicinal drugs that could be developed for relatively small 
markets would remain “orphans”: companies would not have been willing to make the large 
financial commitments required to nurture these drugs from infancy to adulthood. Through 2008, 
the FDA designated 1,954 orphan drug submissions and had granted market exclusivity on 335 
drugs that had reached approval (see Figure 7). 
 
As shown in Figure 7, the annual number of designations climbed in the 1980s to reach a local 
peak of 88 in 1990, with an annual average of 79 over 1988-1991. The annual average fell to 56 
in 1992-1997, and then rose somewhat to 70 in 1998-2002.  Since 2003 the annual numbers of 
designations have reached new heights, with a record 165 in 2008.  The 24 approvals in 1996 
remain an all-time annual high, while the six approvals in 2001 were the fewest since 1986. 
From 2002-2008, the average annual number of approvals was 17.  Given the high levels of 
designations since 2003, we can expect that approvals will be at much higher levels over the next 
decade or so. 
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Figure 7: Number of orphan drug designations and approvals per year, 1983-2008 
 
 
 
Source: Food and Drug Administration 2009 
 
An orphan drug may or may not be covered by a patent. In its original formulation in 1983, the 
Act only covered drugs that were not patentable, but an amendment to the Act in 1985 made 
patented drugs potentially eligible for Orphan Drug benefits as well. While the duration of a 
patent is for 20 years and market exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act is only seven, the latter 
becomes effective once a drug has already been approved by the FDA for sale while, given the 
typically long duration of the drug development process, a patent may well be close to 
expiration, or even expired, by the time a drug is ready to be sold to the public.   
What makes a disease “rare”? The Act of 1983 defined a rare disease as one that “occurs so 
infrequently in the United States that there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of 
developing and making available…a drug…will be recovered from sales in the United States 
(Hogan 1995, 534). In an amendment to the Act in 1985, the definition was changed to either a 
disease that affects less than 200,000 people, or, if it affects more, a disease for which a drug 
cannot be developed profitably. A company retains its right to market exclusivity even if the 
number of people with the disease becomes greater than 200,000 during the seven-year 
exclusivity period.   
Moreover, a company can file for orphan drug designation for multiple indications of the same 
drug. For example, an orphan drug designation for “the treatment of chronic myelogenous 
leukemia” that Novartis obtained on January 31, 2001 was approved by the FDA, with market 
exclusivity, on May 10, 2001 under the tradename Gleevec. During the last five months of 2005 
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Novartis filed for five other orphan drug designations, and won approval for all five on October 
19, 2006, each one under the tradename Gleevec. There may be long time-lags between an 
original orphan drug designation and subsequent ones for the same drug. For example, in 1988 
the Danish pharmaceutical company, NovoNordisk, received an orphan drug designation for “the 
treatment of bleeding episodes in hemophilia A or B patients with inhibitors to Factor VIII or 
Factor IX”, which was approved by the FDA in 1999 and marketed under the tradename 
NovoSeven. In 2004 NovoNordisk filed for seven more indications for NovoSeven, of which 
three won FDA approval in 2005.  
 
In addition, a company that has received FDA approval for an orphan drug may subsequently 
find that it has one or more non-orphan applications. For example, Allergan filed for two orphan 
drug designations in 1984, one in 1986, and one in 1991 for a drug known as Botox. FDA 
approval for the two 1984 designations came in 1989 and for the 1986 designation in 2000. The 
indication approved in 2000 was for “treatment of cervical dystonia in adults to decrease the 
severity of abnormal head position and neck pain associated with cervical dystonia”. But 
Allergan had also discovered that Botox could be used for “the temporary treatment of moderate 
to severe frown lines between the brows”,6 and had made the drug a leader in cosmetics. The 
company also markets Botox as a treatment for severe under arm sweating. Indeed, according to 
Allergan (2008 10-K, 8), Botox “is currently approved in 75 countries for up to 21 unique 
indications.”   In 2008 Botox generated $1,310 million in revenues (representing 30 percent of 
the company’s product sales), of which therapeutic uses were 50 percent and cosmetic uses the 
other 50 percent (Allergan 2008 10-K
A brochure published in June 2005 by the Genetic and Rare Diseases Center of the NIH states 
that there are more than 7,000 rare diseases that afflict a total of 25 million Americans – or 1 in 
12 of the total population and an average of about 3,600 people per rare disease (NHGRI and 
ORD 2005). The National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD) database contains reports on 
1,150 rare diseases.
, 64, 66). 
7
                                                 
6 www.botoxcosmetic.com 
7 www.rarediseases.org 
 Rare diseases are often genetic, and, especially given that its enactment 
coincided with the first wave of biotech startups, the Orphan Drug Act has been of particular 
importance to small biotech companies. One role that NORD has played has been to encourage 
large pharmaceutical companies that have been reluctant to use their proprietary knowledge to 
develop specific orphan drugs to license that knowledge to smaller companies (Meyers 2000). 
Table 1 shows the number of orphan drug designations and approvals of companies that as of the 
May 2009 had control over at least 15 designations, including designations obtained by 
companies that subsequently were acquired. The fifteen companies listed in Table 1 accounted 
for 23 percent of the 2,000 designations and 38 percent of the 335 approvals from 1983 through 
May 5, 2009. Among these companies are many of the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
companies such as Novartis, Roche, Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Bayer 
Schering, AstraZeneca, Merck Serono, Bristol-Meyers-Squibb, Abbott, and Novo Nordisk as 
well as few dedicated BP companies including Amgen, Genzyme, Biogen Idec, and 
Immunomedics.  Dedicated BP companies MedImmune and Genentech would have been on the 
list had they not been acquired, respectively, by AstraZeneca in 2007 and Roche in 2009. 
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Table 1. Orphan drugs designations and approvals, companies with 15 or more 
designations, 1983-2009, as of May 5, 2009 
Company  DES APP Tradenames 
Novartis (including Sandoz and Chiron) 
 
47 17 Cibacalcin, Lamprene, Zometa/Zabel, Gleevec (6), Simulect, 
Sandostatin LAR (3), Exjade, Betaseron, Proleukin (2) 
Roche* (including Behringer Mannheim, 
Genentech, Hoffmann-Laroche) 
47 15 Roferon-A (2), Lariam (2), Hivid, Vesanoid, Zenapax, Protropin, 
Nutropin (4), Nutropin Depot, Pulmozyme, Rituxan 
Johnson&Johnson (including ALZA, Centocor, 
R. W. Johnson Pharmaceutical Research 
Institute, OMRIX, Scios, Scios Nova, Tibotec) 
45 5 Procrit, Leustatin Injection, Remicade (2), Elmiron, Doxil 
GlaxoSmithKline (including Burroughs 
Wellcome, Genelabs, Glaxo Wellcome, Sirtris, 
SmithKline Beecham) 
44 18 Digibind, Retrovir (2), Exosurf Neonatal for Intratracheal 
Suspension (2,) Alkeran For Injection, Mepron (2), Flolan (2), 
Lamictal, Bexxar, Arranon, Triostat, Halfan, Albenza (2), 
Promacta 
Pfizer (including Coley, Pharmacia, Pharmacia 
& Upjohn, G. D. Searle, Sugen, Upjohn, 
Warner-Lambert ) 
43 9 Zinecard, Genotropin (3), Aromasin, ATnativ, Ellence, 
Cyklokapron, Cerebyx 
Bayer Schering (including Berlex) 
 
40 11 Intron A, Rebetol, Betaseron, Fludara, Betapace, Prolastin, 
Thrombate III, Kogenate, Gamimune N, Trasylol, Nexavar 
Amgen (including Immunex) 28 12 Epogen (2), Neupogen (4), Sensipar, Leucovorin calcium (2), 
Leukine (2), Enbrel 
AstraZeneca (including MedImmune) 29 5 Respigam, Hexalen, Neutrexin, Ethyol (2) 
Genzyme (including ILEX Oncology and 
Peptimmune) 
28 7 Ceredase, Cerezyme, Thyrogen, Campath, Fabrazyme, Clolar, 
Myozyme 
Biogen Idec (including Syntonix) 25 2 Zevalin, Avonex 
Immunomedics (including IBC) 22 0  
Merck Serono 20 10 Novantrone (3), Metrodin, Serostim, Geref, Gonal-F, Zorbtive, 
Luveris, Saizen 
Bristol-Myers-Squibb 17 8 Sprycel (2), Ifex, Vumon for injection, Megace, Blenoxane, Taxol, 
Droxia 
Abbott Laboratories (including Knoll) 17 2 Panhematin, Humira 
Novo Nordisk 15 5 Norditropin, NovoSeven (4) 
DES=designations / APP=approvals 
Note: Data on designations and approval for each company are as of May 2009, and include designations and 
approvals in the name of firms that were subsequently acquired by the company. 
* On March 26, 2009 Genentech became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Roche.  Prior to the acquisition, Genentech 
had 22 designations and eight approvals. 
Source: Food and Drug Administration 2009 
 
Most orphan drugs are expensive. Even when the size of the market for a drug is small, the 
revenues can be substantial. To take some examples of leading therapeutic drugs, the average 
annual cost of Amgen’s Epogen and Neupogen (for anemia) is $5,000 to $20,000; Genentech’s 
Rituxan (for rheumatoid arthritis), $15,000-$20,000; Genzyme’s Cerezyme (for Gaucher’s 
disease), $150,000-$225,000; Biogen Idec’s Avonex (for multiple sclerosis), $20,000-$24,000;  
Merck Serono’s Rebif (for multiple sclerosis), $20,000-$24,000; Gilead Sciences’ AmBisone 
(for AIDS), over $15,000; Novartis’s Gleevec (for cancer), over $40,500; and Millennium’s 
Velcade (for cancer), over $50,000 (see Caremark 2006, 25; Stern and Reissman 2006, 737).   
 
Table 2 shows the dependence on revenues from drugs that have had orphan status of the leading 
dedicated BP companies.  Note that (similar to the case of Botox outlined above) a portion of the 
revenues included in the “orphan drug” revenues in Table 2 are from non-orphan applications of 
drugs that have had orphan drug status.  The point is that at formative periods in their histories, 
several leading biotech companies have achieved significant growth through the development 
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and marketing of drugs with orphan status. As can be seen in the row labeled TOTAL 1 in Table 
2, in 2008 orphan drugs represented 59 percent of the total revenues and 61 percent of the 
product revenues of the six leading dedicated BP companies. Note that Amgen’s two most recent 
blockbuster drugs, Aranesp with 2008 revenues of $3.1 billion and Neulasta with 2007 revenues 
of $3.3 billion, are second-generation low-dosage derivatives of Epogen and Neupogen 
respectively.  If we treat these two drugs as products with “orphan” origins, then in 2008 orphan 
drugs were 74 percent of the total revenues and 74 percent of the product revenues of the six 
leading companies.   
 
Table 2. Orphan drugs as a percentage of revenues of leading biotech companies, 2007 and 2008 
 Total  
revenues, $m. 
(A) 
Product  
revenues, $m 
(B) 
Orphan drug 
revenues, $m 
(C) 
C as % of A  C as % of  B 
  
 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 
Amgen 15,003 14,771 14,687 14,311 7,992 6,182 53 42 54 43 
Genentech 13,418 11,724 13,070 11,427 10,235 8,089 76 69 78 71 
Gilead Sciences 4,605 3,813 4,197 3,457 2,580 2,064 56 54 61 60 
Genzyme 4,098 3,172 4,079 3,147 3,331 2,794 81 88 82 89 
Biogen Idec 5,336 4,230 5,303 4,201 1,024 897 19 21 19 21 
Cephalon 1,975 1,773 1,944 1,727 1,064 852 54 48 55 49 
Millennium   528   528   397  75  75 
TOTAL 1 44,434 40,011 43,279 38,798 26,225 21,275 59 53 61 55 
TOTAL 2* 44,434 40,011 43,279 38,798 32,662 27,889 74 70 75 72 
Orphan drug revenues by company and tradename (2008 and 2007 sales in $millions in parentheses): 
Amgen: Enbrel (3598; 3230), Epogen (2456; 2489), Neupogen (1341; 1277); Sensipa (597; 463) 
Genentech: Rituxan (2851; 2285), Avastin (2908; 2296), Herceptin (1819; 1287), Nutropin (375; 371), Tarceva 
(457; 417), Activase (-; 268) Pulmozyne(302; 223) 
Gilead Sciences: AmBisome (289.7; 263); Letairis(112.9; 21.0); Viread (621.2; 613.2) 
Genzyme: Cerezyme (1239; 1133), Fabrazyme (494.3; 424), Thyrogen (148.4; 114), Thymoglobolin (149.1; 127), 
Campath/Clolar/Mozobil (101.2; 65); Myzyme (296.2; 200.7); Aldurazyme (151.3; -) 
Biogen Idec: Avonex (2202.6; 1,868), Rituxan (1128.2; 926.1) 
Cephalon: Provigil (988.4; 852)  Treanda (75.1; -) 
Millennium: Velcade (265, 327) (includes revenues from strategic alliances and royalties) 
Note: In May, 2008, Millennium was acquired by Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited.  
* Total 2 treats Amgen’s Aranesp (3119; 3614) and Neulasta (3318; 3000) as derivative of orphan drugs. 
Sources: Company SEC filings and annual reports 
 
The financial histories of these companies show that orphan drugs were of even greater 
importance to revenues in the earlier phases of enterprise growth. More generally, the 
importance of orphan drugs in the growth of the BP industry can be seen by comparing the 
timing and growth of revenues for orphan and non-orphan blockbusters, as is done in the two 
panels of Figure 8. Comparing the two panels, orphan drugs are more numerous, their revenue 
growth began earlier, and many of them have greater 2007 sales than the leading non-orphan 
drugs.  If we were to transfer Amgen’s Aranesp and Neulasta to the orphan drug panel, the 
centrality of orphan drugs in driving the development of the biotech industry would become even 
more apparent. 
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Figure 8a & 8b. Blockbuster biopharmaceutical orphan (8a) & non-orphan (8b) drugs, 
1992-2008 
 
 
 
Source: Company SEC filings and annual reports
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We have already seen an indication of the important role of big pharma in BP in Table 1 above. 
The growing importance of big pharma to the biotech industry, and vice versa, becomes apparent 
when we attach company names to the blockbuster drugs displayed in Figure 8.  Table 3 lists the 
companies for which these BP drugs, orphan and non-orphan, generate revenues, with big 
pharma in italics.   
 
Table 3. Companies with blockbuster biopharmaceutical drugs through 2008 
 
ORPHAN BLOCKBUSTERS NON-ORPHAN BLOCKBUSTERS 
COMPANY Trade name COMPANY Trade name 
Amgen & Wyeth Enbrel Baxter Advate 
Genentech Avastin Amgen Aranesp 
Biogen Idec Avonex Eli Lilly Humalog 
Bayer (Schering AG)   Betaseron/Betaferon Abbott Humira 
Allergan Botox Eli Lilly Humulin 
Genzyme Ceredase/Cerezyme Sanofi-Aventis Lantus 
Sanofi-Aventis/Teva Copaxone Genentech 
(Roche)/Novartis 
Lucentis 
Amgen Epogen Genentech/Roche/Chugai NeoRecormon/Epogin 
Merck-Serono/Bristol-
Myers/Eli Lilly (ImClone) 
Erbitux Amgen Neulasta 
Novartis Gleevec Wyeth Prevnar 
Genentech/Roche Herceptin Abbott/MedImmune Synagis 
Bayer Kogenate   
Amgen Neupogen   
Novo-Nordisk NovoSeven   
Roche Pegasys   
Schering-Plough PEG-INTRON   
Johnson&Johnson/Ortho 
Biotech 
Procrit/Eprex   
Serono Rebif   
Johnson&Johnson Remicade   
Genentech/Biogen/Roche Rituxan/MabThera   
Note: Big Pharma in italics 
Source: Company SEC filings and annual reports 
 
The distinction between big pharma and big biopharma has become blurred. For both, in the 
2000s, the US government still serves as an investor in knowledge creation, subsidizer of drug 
development, protector of drug markets, and, last but not least – as we shall discuss in the next 
section – purchaser of the drugs that the biopharmaceutical companies have to sell. The BP 
industry has become big business because of big government, and, as we shall now show, 
remains highly dependent on big government to sustain its commercial success. 
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4. Sustainability of the US Biotech Boom 
 
On the supply side, the biotech boom has depended on technological innovation in the 
development of new drugs for the treatment of diseases, many of which were previously 
untreatable. In the forefront have been NIH funding of the life sciences knowledge base and an 
emphasis on the part of business enterprises on finding cures for “genetic and rare diseases” that 
fall within the purview of the Orphan Drug Act. The sustainability of the US biotech boom 
depends in part on the ability of the United States to continue to innovate in the BP industry, 
especially given an inevitable increase in global technological competition.  
 
On the demand side, the US biotech boom has depended on the ability of those afflicted by these 
diseases to acquire the new biopharmaceuticals.  Unlike the demand for most innovative goods 
and services, the demand for biotech drugs is not directly dependent on personal disposable 
income and consumer choice.  The richer households that have the money to pay both the higher 
taxes needed to support public insurance plans and the higher premia needed to fund private 
insurance plans are not necessarily the same households that are in need of the drugs.   
 
On the demand side, the key question is whether there will be sufficient medical coverage for the 
nation’s population to absorb the industry’s supply of BP drugs, especially when innovations in 
the BP industry have been transformed into approved drugs that are often very expensive. In the 
2000s the richest nation in the world is already straining to afford the wonders of modern 
medical technology. Prescription drug expenditures (PDE) have been increasing as a proportion 
of national health expenditures (NHE). NHE rose from 5.2 percent of GDP in 1960 to 9.1 
percent in 1980 and 13.8 percent in 2000, and continued their climb to 16.2 percent in 2007. A 
rapidly increasing component of the rise in NHE is prescription drugs. Since 1981, when they 
reached a low for the whole period of 4.6 percent, PDE as a proportion of NHE have been on the 
rise, averaging a record 11.4 percent for the period 1997-2007.   
 
An increasing proportion of NHE has been borne by public funds. Government expenditure as a 
proportion of NHE was 24.8 percent in 1960 but jumped to 37.7 percent in 1970 as a result of the 
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 as policy pillars in the “War on Poverty” (NCHS 
2006, 374). This proportion stood at 42.1 percent in 1980, 40.4 percent in 1990, and 44.3 percent 
in 2000. In 2007 the government share of NHE was 46.2 percent. 
  
Since the early 1980s, prescription drug expenditures (PDE) as a proportion of NHE have been 
on the rise, averaging a record 10.1 percent for the period 2003-2005. Plan D of Medicare, 
introduced on January 1, 2006 to implement the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003, further increased PDE as a proportion of NHE to 10.3 percent in 
2006. In total, at the beginning of January 2008, 39.6 million people received comprehensive 
prescription drug coverage under Medicare, including 24.4 million under Plan D, of which over 
9 million were low-income beneficiaries who receive the drugs at little if any cost (O’Sullivan 
2008, 39; see also Montgomery and Lee 2006; CMS 2007).   
 
More generally, as a proportion of GDP, the United States spends far more than any other nation 
on health care; in 2006 the US figure was 15.3 percent, followed by Switzerland at 11.3 percent, 
France at 11.1 percent, and Germany at 10.4 percent (www.who.int/whosis/data/Search.jsp). The 
Lazonick and Tulum: US Biopharmaceutical Finance 
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high cost of US health care raises the question of whether, going forward, there will be sufficient 
public and private medical coverage for the nation’s population to absorb the industry’s supply 
of BP drugs, especially when innovations in the BP industry have been transformed into 
approved drugs that are for relatively small populations and that are very expensive. As was 
shown in Figure 7, in the United States the past few years have seen a quantum increase in the 
number of orphan drug designations, which means that there are greater numbers of drugs for 
genetic and rare diseases in the pipeline. Moreover, with some 7,000 such diseases having been 
identified and an estimated 25 million Americans who can potentially make use of them, the 
need for new drugs remains far from being met.  
 
In the 2000s the limits to effective demand for BP drugs in the United States have been 
transcended to some extent through exports (Lazonick et al. 2007). Europe is the biggest foreign 
market for US BP exports. Among Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit export classifications, the 
second largest product category to the EU158
Many leading European pharmaceutical companies are tapping into US biotechnology research 
through R&D alliances, acquisitions of US companies, and R&D facilities in the United States. 
For example, in 2002, Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical company, established its worldwide 
R&D headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, next to MIT (Griffith 2002). As already 
mentioned, the regional concentrations of biotech research and companies that can be found in 
the vicinity of Boston-Cambridge, San Francisco, San Diego, and Washington-Baltimore are of 
utmost importance to the commercialization of the findings of NIH-funded knowledge base (see 
Cortright and Mayer 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Porter et al. 2006), and remain a 
distinctive source of competitive advantage for the firms that operate in these dynamic industrial 
districts.  Nevertheless, given the European presence in the US BP industry, we can expect that 
 in 2007, with 3.2 percent of the total, was “Other 
medicaments, packaged for retail sale” (HS-300490). Of US HS-300490 exports to the world, 57 
percent went to the EU15. The seventh largest product classification, with 2.1 percent of the 
EU15 total, was “Antisera and blood fractions/immunological products” (HS-300210); that is, 
materials for the manufacture of BP products. Of US HS-300210 exports to the world, 80 percent 
went to the EU15. In 1997 these two classifications combined had accounted for only 0.9 percent 
of all US exports to the EU15; a decade later, 5.3 percent.   
 
The sustainability of the growth of the BP industry in the United States, therefore, depends in 
part on whether US BP firms can continue to capture European demand. In 2001 the European 
Union passed its own Orphan Drug Act as part of an effort to catch up to the United States in 
biopharmaceuticals (Young 2007; Heemstra et al. 2008). Reflecting perhaps a process of 
European import substitution in BP, US exports of hormones (HS-293790), which had risen from 
0.02 percent of all US exports to the EU15 in 1996 to 0.97 percent in 2004, fell sharply to 0.59 
percent in 2005 and were down to 0.45 percent in 2007. According to the Ernst & Young annual 
biotech report, in 2008 Europe had more biotech companies than the United States (1,836 to 
1,754), although the United States had more than twice as many publicly listed companies than 
Europe (371 to 178). The US BP industry has had access to much more venture financing than 
the European industry, but the Europeans are catching up (Ernst & Young 2009, 25).  
 
                                                 
8 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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the latest knowledge and cutting-edge technology will continually flow from the United States to 
Europe. 
 
The subsidies and protection provided by the Orphan Drug Act along with the NIH-funded 
knowledge base and non-orphan patent protection will continue to entice the business sector, 
including venture capital, to invest in an industry characterized by extraordinarily long product 
development cycles with highly uncertain prospects for commercial success. Such will especially 
be the case, as we have argued, if venture capitalists and established pharmaceutical companies 
expect that a speculative stock market will enable them to secure returns on their biotech 
investments long before the actual products in which they have invested generate substantial 
sales.   
 
At the same time, however, the very importance of the stock market to biotech firms in particular 
and high-tech companies in general may serve to undermine the extent of the investments that 
BP companies make in generate innovative products. Over the past two decades, but especially 
in the 2000s, the executives of US business corporations, encouraged by Wall Street, have 
become committed to the practice of allocation substantial corporate resources to buy back their 
own corporate stock (Lazonick 2008; 2009a, ch. 6; and 2009b). 
  
Many of the major pharmaceutical companies and the dedicated BP companies are very active 
stock repurchasers. Yet in the pharmaceutical industry writ large, there has long been a debate 
over the high prices of prescription drugs in the United States compared with over parts of the 
world including Japan and the high-wage nations of the European Union. The pharmaceutical 
companies argue that, since so much of the research on these drugs is done in the United States, 
they need to charge higher prices to fund R&D. Back in 1990 President George H. W. Bush 
vetoed a Congressional bill to modify the Orphan Drug Act in order to create more competition 
and keep down drug prices (Gibbons 1990). In recent years Congress has been debating whether, 
under Plan D of Medicare, the government should use its purchasing power to step in and 
negotiate prices with the drug companies. Then, as now, the pharmaceutical companies have 
argued that any attempt to regulate drug prices will cut into company profits, which will in turn 
diminish the amount of resources that companies have available to invest in R&D and, thereby, 
generate a flow of innovative products.   
 
Yet, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, if one looks at the financial behavior of many big pharma and 
dedicated BP companies, a number of them use substantial portions of their profits to buy back 
their own stock. Among big pharma companies, over the decade 1997-2008, Pfizer did 
repurchases equal to 73 percent of R&D expenditures, Merck 72 percent, and Johnson & 
Johnson 60 percent. When the substantial dividends that these companies pay are added to their 
repurchases, the ratio of distributions to R&D shoots up to 1.63 at Merck, 1.42 percent at Pfizer, 
and 1.17 percent at Johnson & Johnson.    
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Table 4. Distributions to shareholders in the forms of stock repurchases and dividends 
by major US-based pharmaceutical companies, 1997-2008 
 
  Sales, 
2008 
Fortune 
500 rank 
RP/ 
NI 
(TD+RP)/ 
NI 
RP/ 
R&D 
(TD+RP)/ 
R&D 
  $m 2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 
Johnson & Johnson 63,747 29 0.40 0.79 0.60 1.17 
Pfizer 48,296 46 0.73 1.41 0.73 1.42 
Abbott 29,528 80 0.18 0.71 0.27 1.04 
Merck 23,850 103 0.41 0.93 0.72 1.63 
Wyeth 22,834 110 0.15 0.67 0.16 0.71 
BMS 20,597 120 0.23 0.91 0.26 1.03 
Eli Lilly 20,378 122 0.29 1.03 0.22 0.77 
Schering-Plough 18,502 138 0.13 0.75 0.08 0.45 
Allergan 4,403 517 0.68 0.93 0.32 0.43 
 
TD=total (preferred plus common) dividends; RP=stock repurchases; NI=net income after taxes, before 
extraordinary items; R&D=research and development 
Sources: Compustat database; 2009 Fortune 500 list 
(http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/full_list/) 
 
Table 5 charts the stock repurchase activity for 1997-2008 for leading dedicated BP companies.  
Amgen has repurchased stock in every year since 1992, for a total of $26.7 billion through 2008.  
In many years the cost of Amgen’s stock buybacks has surpassed the company’s R&D 
expenditures, and for the period 1997-2008 were equal to 97 percent of R&D outlays.  
Genentech only began to do repurchases in 2001. From 2001 through 2008, the company 
allocated $7.4 billion to stock buybacks and $10.2 billion to R&D expenditures, for a repurchase 
to R&D ratio of .73. Genzyme did its first repurchases in 2007 and 2008, representing 42 percent 
of its net income. 
 
Table 5. Distributions to shareholders in the forms of stock repurchases and dividends, 
leading dedicated biopharmaceutical companies, 1997-2008 
 
  Sales, 
2008 
Fortune 
500 rank 
RP/ 
NI 
(TD+RP)/ 
NI 
RP/ 
R&D 
(TD+RP)/ 
R&D 
  $m 2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 1997-2008 
Amgen 15,003 168 1.15 1.15 0.97 0.97 
Genentech 13,418 201* 0.72 0.72 0.63 0.63 
Gilead Sciences 5,336 444 0.84 0.84 0.50 0.50 
Genzyme 4,605 502 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.06 
Biogen Idec 4,098 546 2.63 2.63 0.86 0.86 
* Genentech is not on the 2009 Fortune 500 list. If it had been, it would have ranked 201st in revenues.  
For definition of acronyms, see Table 4. 
Notes: Biogen Idec includes only Biogen repurchases and R&D before the 2003 merger of the two companies. 
Sources: Compustat database; 2009 Fortune 500 list 
(http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/full_list/) 
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Why do companies do stock buybacks? Their purpose is to raise stock prices. Prime beneficiaries 
of stock repurchases, and the consequent boosting of stock prices, are the high-level corporate 
executives who make these allocative decisions (see Lazonick 2008; 2009a; and 2009b). Gains 
from the exercise of stock options are the main component of the well-known explosion of top 
executive pay that has occurred since the 1980s (see Hall and Leibman 1998; Jensen et al. 2005). 
Table 6 shows the average gains per person from the exercise of stock options over the past 
decade by the CEO and other four highest paid executives of six leading dedicated biotech firms, 
including Amgen and Genentech. Aided by stock buybacks, the CEO and other four highest paid 
executives at Amgen reaped an average of $105.3 million from gains from stock options for the 
period 1997-2008, while the top 5 at Genentech averaged $116.2 million for the period 1995-
2008. Among big pharma companies that are large-scale repurchasers of stock, the average gains 
of the top 5 from the exercise of stock options for 1997-2008 were $30.0 million at Johnson & 
Johnson, $32.4 million at Merck, and $46.6 million at Pfizer. 
 
Table 6.  Gains from the exercise of stock options, average for CEO and other four highest 
paid executives, 1995-2008 (in US dollars) 
  AMGEN GENENTECH GILEAD 
SCIENCES 
GENZYME BIOGEN IDEC 
1995 6,817,627 825,701 * 465,309 2,464,961 
1996 5,279,364 $325,679 411,250 721,100 298,066 
1997 3,010,156 0 832,369 $44,373 4,293,557 
1998  11,307,884 $592,149 491,235 1,471,548 615,541 
1999  13,330,697 10,763,997 633,146 4,652,625 8,132,058 
2000  42,131,827 23,414,861 2,227,746 1,846,424 9,070,194 
2001  4,321,772 371,803 4,747,643 5,344,364 1,841,877 
2002  2,951,349 0 2,530,736 0 736,089 
2003 2,787,683 14,253,173 6,437,089 4,897,291 1,848,609 
2004 1,729,808 24,175,200 7,563,908 2,116,807 14,221,925 
2005 9,444,582 31,149,362 9,535,369 10,662,508 2,378,898 
2006 1,036,550 4,445,274 13,967,766 0 1,695,916 
2007 149,045 5,909,682 14,218,719 4,722,735 3,247,255 
2008 1,190,447 ** 767,552 2,057,562  4,235,246 
1995-2007  $116,226,881     
1996-2008   $64,364,528   
1995-2008 $105,488,791   $39,002,646 $55,080,192 
* Gilead Sciences did not report these data for fiscal 1995. 
** In 2009 Genentech was acquired by Roche and did not release these data for 2008 
Sources: SEC filings and Compustat database 
 
Stock buybacks represent a manipulation of the stock market, and can come at the expense of 
meeting the challenges of drug development.  In May 2007 Amgen borrowed $3.2 billion ($2.0 
billion due in 2008, $1.1 billion in 2017, and $0.9 due in 2037) to help finance a $5.0 billion 
stock repurchase, the largest annual purchase that the company had ever done (Amgen 10-Q, 
period ending June 30, 2007). At the same time, as Amgen reported in its quarterly financial 
filing, sales of its blockbuster anemia drug, Aranesp, declined by 19 percent because of an FDA 
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ruling that dosage levels had to be cut because of cases of heart attacks from high doses (Chase 
2007). 
 
On August 13, just after Amgen issued its second quarter 10-Q filing, an analyst at Bernstein 
Research wrote: “Amgen will likely lose at least 40 percent of their US Aranesp revenue by 2008 
with even greater downside possible for both Aranesp and Epogen if upcoming [Medicare and 
Medicaid] reimbursement and regulatory decisions go against them.” But the analyst reportedly 
added: “If Amgen cuts costs, continues to buy back stock and improves its tax rate…it could 
increase its earnings per share by 10-12% each year from 2008 to 2011, even if it does not 
develop any significant drug candidates.”9
As outlined in this paper, and as depicted in Figure 9, the US BP finance model rests on NIH 
funding of the knowledge base as its foundation complemented by various types of government 
subsidies, of which those available to BP firms under the Orphan Drug Act appear to be of 
particular importance. Building on the availability of government funding and subsidies, venture 
capitalists and established pharmaceutical companies provide cash for BP startups to develop 
 
 
Four days later, Amgen announced that it would reduce its workforce by 14 percent, or 2,600 
jobs, cut capital expenditures by $1.9 billion, close some of its production facilities, and reduce 
R&D expenses (which had been at 27 percent from 2003 through 2006) to 20 percent of sales. It 
may well be that Amgen borrowed money to do the $5-billion stock repurchase because it 
wanted to offset the adverse impact of the Aranesp news on its stock price. In any case, the 
priorities of Amgen’s top executives in their allocation of corporate resources seem clear. 
 
In assessing the arguments of the relation between drug prices and BP investments in R&D, 
government policy makers should take seriously two salient issues that business proponents of a 
“free market” economy prefer to ignore. The first issue is the fact that government investment in 
research is more important than business investment for supporting innovation in the BP 
industry. The second issue is that when US BP companies get high profits from high prices they 
do not necessarily invest those high profits in R&D.   
 
These two issues are intertwined. Given the role of government in funding the biotech industry, 
the government should take an active role in the governance of companies that make use of this 
support.  Since the 1980s the US business community, the BP industry included, has embraced 
the ideology that the performance of their companies and the economy are best served by the 
“maximization of shareholder value” (see Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2008 and 
2009a, ch. 6). It is an ideology that, among other things, says that any attempt by the government 
to interfere in the allocation of resources can only undermine economic performance. In practice, 
what shareholder ideology has meant for corporate resource allocation is that when companies 
reap more profits they spend a substantial proportion of them on stock repurchases in an effort to 
boost their stock prices, thus enriching first and foremost the corporate executives who make 
these allocative decisions. 
 
5. Financialization and Innovation: A Research Agenda  
 
                                                 
9 “Amgen moves up after analyst says company will restructure to increase earnings,” Associated Press Financial 
Wire, August 13, 2007. 
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drugs. In terms of the time required to develop a commercial drug, it is not unusual for the BP 
firm that is being funded to remain a “startup” for two decades or more. Through M&A deals 
and IPOs, however, the venture capitalists and the established pharmaceutical companies that 
fund drug development often are able to secure returns on their investments long before the BP 
startup actually develops a commercial drug, and in many cases even if the BP firm never 
develops a commercial drug.   
 
Figure 9. The US biopharmaceutical funding structure 
 
 
 
Ernst & Young’s press release for its 2009 Beyond Borders biotechnology report observed that.  
“the prolonged and systematic funding drought is placing the business model that fueled biotech 
growth for the past 33 years under unprecedented strain.” Yet, according to Ernst & Young, in 
2008 the revenues of publicly traded biotech companies grew by 12 percent over the previous 
year, reaching $89.7 billion, and taken together these companies showed a profit. The flow of 
venture capital into the industry remained strong in 2008, down only 19 percent from a record 
high of $6 billion the previous year. Meanwhile, the total value of M&A deals in biotech was 
$28.5 billion, an unprecedented amount if one excludes megadeals. The Ernst & Young press 
release might have added that in 2008, NIH funding, the backbone of the industry, was $30 
billion, about the same as the previous year. 
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What then is the source of “the prolonged and systematic funding drought” that is placing the 
biotech business model under strain?  According to Venture Xperts (see Figure 3 above), in 2008 
there was only one venture-backed biotech IPO in the United States, worth less than $6 million, 
down from 21 deals for $1,245 million in 2004, 11 deals for $671 million in 2005, 14 deals for 
$714 million in 2006, and 11 deals for $679 million in 2007 (see also Ernst and Young 2009, 
24). Through the first half of 2009, there were no venture-backed biotech IPOs in the United 
States. In the absence of a speculative stock market that will absorb product-less IPOs, the BP 
business model is not providing venture capitalists and big pharma who make equity investments 
in BP startups with the exit opportunities that they have enjoyed in the past.  The fear is that if 
this “funding drought” persists, the flow of venture capital and big pharma equity investments 
will start to dry up as well.  
 
From the perspective that we have set out in this paper, there are a number of questions 
concerning the sustainability of the BP business model that require in-depth research on the 
sources and uses of funds that characterize the US BP business model, and on the implications of 
the combination of government funding and the speculative stock market for the successes and 
failures of companies and products over the BP industry’s three decades long history.10
• At the base of the funding structure depicted in Figure 9, how tightly linked is NIH funding 
to the emergence of successful drugs, such as the blockbusters shown in Figures 8a and 8b?  
   
• How important have subsidies and protection under the Orphan Drug Act been to successful 
drug development?   
• As we move up the funding structure, how successful have venture capitalists and big 
pharma been in extracting value from their investments in startups in advance of the 
generation of commercial products?   
• What impacts does this value extraction have on the commitment of finance to the drug 
development process subsequent to an IPO? Put differently, does it matter to the success or 
failure of the drug development process if key actors in the formation and growth of BP firms 
have more to gain from a speculative stock market than from the commercialization of a 
drug?   
• Is a startup acquired through an M&A deal, that inherently becomes a real asset on the books 
of the acquiring drug company, of a higher quality (that is, further down the road toward 
developing a commercial product) than an IPO in which speculative investors in publicly 
traded stock can easily dispose of their investments?   
• How does this mode of BP finance affect that ultimate cost of drug development, and the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the drug development process?   
• And when a BP company develops a profitable drug, how does a stock-market orientation, as 
manifested in stock buybacks and stock-based remuneration of executives, affect the 
commitment of finance to the further growth of the firm? 
                                                 
10 We are doing this research as part of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework project on Finance, 
Innovation, and Growth (FINNOV) in collaboration with Mariana Mazzucato of The Open University; Claude 
Dupuy, Yannick Lung, and Matthieu Montalbon of Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV; and Mustafa Erdem 
Sakinc, formerly a graduate student in the Department of Regional Economic and Social Development of the 
University of Massachusetts Lowell, who is working on FINNOV as part of the Bordeaux team. Related research 
on Ireland is being carried out by the authors of this paper under a collaborative agreement between the Centre 
for Innovation and Structural Change of the National University of Ireland Galway, directed by Paul Ryan, and 
the UMass Lowell Center for Industrial Competitiveness under a European Commission Sixth Framework Marie 
Curie actions grant for the Transfer of Knowledge. 
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In seeking to answer these questions, our analysis will be guided by “the theory of innovative 
enterprise”, with its focus on strategic, organizational, and financial factors in the growth of the 
firm (see Lazonick 2002; 2004; and 2007). In our view, the only way to implement this research 
agenda in a way that can generate reliable answers to these questions is through the accumulation 
of company case studies on the basis of a common template. This analytical framework permits 
us to ask how the prevailing mode of finance affects the strategic decisions of those who exercise 
control over the allocation of the BP firm’s resources as well as the organizational integration of 
people with diverse capabilities into the cumulative and collective learning process that is 
essential for successful drug development.   
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